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INTRODUCTION
T HE Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)' created and imposes
broad-based liability for parties that contaminate the environment.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been
vested with the power to impose financial responsibility on potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) for extensive and far-ranging costs associ-
ated with the investigation and remediation of environmental pollu-
tion.2 Such liability can be stratospheric for a PRP who is responsible
for the clean-up of a badly contamnated site or of multiple sites. The
average cost to clean up a single waste site on EPA's National Priori-
ties List is approximately $31 million.3 It is thus no surprise that par-
ties who are targeted as waste site PRPs often turn to their liability
insurers and demand coverage for clean-up liabilities.
* Partner, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, New York Office;
A.B., Franklin and Marshall College, 1976; J.D., New York Law School, 1980.
** Associate, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, New York Office;
B.S.B.A., Boston University, 1982; J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 1986.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), any person who owns or operates a hazardous
substance facility; or disposes of, or arranges for the disposal of, a hazardous sub-
stance; or who accepts hazardous substances for transport to a facility from which
there is a release, or threat of release, into the environment, shall be liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss re-
sulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carred out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
3. LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL, RAND CORP., PRIVATE-SECrOR CLEANUP EXPENDI-
TURES AND TRANSACTION CosTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SITEs (1993).
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I. THE GRANT OF COVERAGE UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY
This article addresses an area of environmental insurance law which
can profoundly influence the amount of coverage potentially available
to PRPs who are insured under policies of comprehensive general lia-
bility (CGL) insurance. Coverage is provided under a typical CGL
policy for potential liabilities to third parties who allege, among other
things, property damage or bodily injury arising out of the unmten-
tional acts or omissions of the policyholder. A CGL policy generally
has two broad coverage components. These are the duties to defend
and to indemnify the insured in legal proceedings instituted by third
parties. A policy form adopted by many CGL insurers grants defense
and indemnity coverage under the following insuring agreement:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an
occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to de-
fend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations
of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such
investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedi-
ent, but the company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or
judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the com-
pany's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements.
4
Pursuant to the foregoing policy language, the duty to indemnify
requires the insurer to pay on behalf of the insured all sums, up to a
specific amount, which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages arising out of bodily injury or property damage caused by a
covered "occurrence."5 In the case of primary insurance, however, an
insurer's coverage obligation is rarely restricted to the duty to indem-
nify A primary CGL policy will also impose upon the insurer the
right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages.
This entitles the insured, subject to the terms, conditions and exclu-
sions of the policy, to a paid defense in lawsuits commenced by third
parties who seek damages.
The duty to defend under a CGL policy obligates the insurer to pay
the fees of attorneys, investigators and expert consultants who pre-
pare and assist in the defense of lawsuits filed against the policyholder.
4. FORM No. GL 00 02 01 73, INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC. (1982, 1986).
5. Pursuant to language found in many CGL policies, an" 'occurrence' means an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." FoRM No. GL 00 00 01 73, INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC. (1982,
1986).
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Depending upon the policy language, defense costs will either count
towards the stated coverage lirmt of the policy or they will be exclu-
sive of the linut. Under a cost-exclusive policy, the insurer's coverage
obligation has the potential to be far greater than the stated mdemnity
limit. This is because defense costs m a cost-exclusive policy will not
serve to mipair the liability limit; only payments for damages in the
form of judgments or settlements impair or exhaust the limits of a
cost-exclusive policy
Defense costs under a cost-exclusive CGL policy can eclipse the
stated policy limit where no settlements or judgments equaling the
limt are sustained. This is quite different from a policy where defense
costs count towards the limit. Any combination of settlements, judg-
ments and defense costs which equals the stated coverage limit will
exhaust such a policy.
A CGL policy generally will contain a provision which broadly de-
fines the kinds of covered costs associated with the defense of law-
suits. For instance, costs falling under the duty to defend may be
defined in a supplementary payments clause which states, m pertinent
part, as follows:
The company will pay, m addition to the applicable limit of liability:
(a) all expenses incurred by the company, all costs taxed against
the insured in any suit defended by the company and all interest on
the entire amount of any judgment therein which accrues after entry
of the judgment and before the company has paid or tendered or
deposited m court that part of the judgment which does not exceed
the limit of the company's liability thereon;
(d) reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at the com-
pany's request in assisting the company in the investigation or de-
fense of any claim or suit ..
As explained more fully below, under a policy where defense costs
do not serve to impair the coverage lirmt, the insured will have great
incentive to classify expenses incurred in legal actions as defense costs
rather than indemnification.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF COSTS UNDER A LIABILITY POLICY
Pursuant to express policy language and interpretive case law, fees
for attorneys, investigators and experts retained in connection with
the defense of lawsuits filed against the policyholder are readily classi-
fied as defense costs.' In the environmental coverage arena, however,
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., New York v. Blank, 745 F Supp. 841, 852 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (An in-
surer under a policy containing a duty to defend must reimburse the insured "for
services rendered which are useful in defending against the first-party complaint.").
See also Colonial Tannmg Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 780 F Supp. 906, 927
(N.D.N.Y. 1991).
1994]
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a question concerning the appropriate characterization of certain costs
has nevertheless arisen. At issue are costs associated with govern-
ment-mandated remedial investigation/feasibility studies (RI/FS), or
similar government-mandated investigative efforts. Pursuant to CER-
CLA, the EPA can force a waste site PRP to perform an investigation
in order to determine the nature and extent of environmental
problems posed by hazardous waste.8 Similar statutes also create en-
forcement powers at the state environmental agency level.9
The RI/FS process may include the monitoring and sampling of air,
water and soil and the compilation of sufficient data to determine the
necessity for, and the proposed extent of, any action required to rem-
edy existing contamination. Remedial investigations address whether
environmental damage can be mitigated or mmunized by controlling
the source of the contamination, or whether additional action is neces-
sary because of migration of contaminants from the site. Feasibility
studies comprise plans for implementing the remediation alternative
selected for the site.10
There is no secret as to why an insured under a cost-exclusive CGL
policy would argue that RI/FS costs should be classified as part of the
insurer's duty to defend. To the extent expenses associated with per-
forming a waste site RI/FS can be attributed to the defense compo-
nent of the policy, there would be more indemmty coverage
potentially available to satisfy the policyholder's liability for the clean-
up. There would also be more mdenmity coverage potentially avail-
able to satisfy liability associated with other claims.
Another reason policyholders may argue that RI/FS costs are part
of the insurer's defense obligation is because the duty to defend is
often held to be broader than the duty to indemnify.11 This means an
insurer could be called upon to provide a defense in cases where the
allegations against the insured conceivably could, if proven, be cov-
ered under the terms of the policy.'2 Based on this more generous
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988).
9. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/22.18 (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REv
STAT. ANN. § 30:2204(a)(2) (West 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11u(b)(2) (West
1992); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV LAW § 27-1313 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.1102(A) (1993); Tnx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 361.185 (West 1992); WASH. REV CODE ANN. § 70.105D.030(1)(b) (West 1992).
10. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1993).
11. See Federal Rice Drug Co. v. Queen Ins. Co., 463 F.2d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 1972);
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 367 F Supp. 27, 30-31 (M.D. Fla.
1973); Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F Supp. 384, 389 (D. Md. 1978); John Mohr &
Sons v. Hanover Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 184 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
12. See Colon v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 484 N.E.2d 1040, 1041-42 (N.Y.
1985); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272, 274-75 (N.Y. 1984); Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 320 N.E.2d 619, 621-22 (N.Y. 1974). See
also 14 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 51:42 (2d ed. rev.
1982 & Supp. 1993); 7C JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4683.01 (Berdal ed. 1979 & Supp. 1993).
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standard for triggering the duty to defend, policyholders often will
move for summary judgment on the duty to defend soon after a law-
suit seeking coverage is filed. The policyholder will argue that the
court merely has to facially examine the underlying allegations in or-
der to determine whether a duty to defend exists while fact-sensitive
indemmty issues are being litigated in the coverage case.' 3
III. THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
Policyholders and insurers often disagree on whether a governmen-
tal directive to remediate environmental contamination (a "PRP let-
ter")14 is a "suit against the insured seeking damages" within the
meamng of this phrase in a CGL policy. A suit seeking damages for
"bodily injury or property damage" is the threshold requirement for
triggering an insurer's duty to defend. Insurers routinely argue that a
PRP letter issued by EPA or another environmental authority seeks
injunctive relief rather than actual damages for bodily injury or prop-
erty damage. A CGL policy does not cover costs associated with
claims for injunctive relief.' Coverage is instead provided for the pol-
icyholder's liability for "damages" which, it is argued by insurers, are
limited to sums payable by reason of liability sustained in a formal
lawsuit or legal proceeding.'6
Many courts have addressed this issue, arriving at different conclu-
sions. For instance, in the case of Ray Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co.,17 the Umted States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit concluded that a PRP letter directing an insured to participate
at its own expense in the remediation of a hazardous waste site did not
constitute a suit seeking damages for injury to property. The court
thus held that no duty to defend arises where the claim against the
policyholder is in the form of a governmental clean-up directive.'8
13. But see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Baugh, 257 N.E.2d 699, 710 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1970) (The insurer, in determining whether a duty to defend exists, is not
limited solely to the allegations against the policyholder. The insurer is permitted to
examine the underlying facts before deciding whether it must provide a defense.).
Accord Charles H. Eichelkraut & Sons, Inc. v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 519 N.E.2d
1180, 1185 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 656 F
Supp. 132, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1986); APPLEmAN, supra note 12, § 4683 ("where the insurer
is aware of facts, not in the pleadings, which clearly disclose an absence of coverage, it
can refuse to defend ").
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(D) (1988).
15. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir.
1955) (damages relating to insured party's refusal to comply with injunction). But see
Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F Supp. 1171, 1186-93 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
16. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977, 987 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
17 974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992).
18. See also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707
(8th Cir. 1992); Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1990); Hecla
Mining Co. v. Continental Ins., No. 92-87608, slip op. (D. Idaho Aug. 19, 1992);
1994]
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A different result was reached in Broadwell Realty Services, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York. 19 In this case, the insured insti-
tuted a lawsuit seeking coverage for the cost of complying with a New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection clean-up directive.
On appeal, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that government-
mandated clean-up costs are recoverable under a CGL policy, even
where no formal lawsuit seeking to compel payment of such costs is
filed.2°
This article does not assume that a PRP letter triggers an insurer's
duty to defend, or that costs associated with performing an RI/FS are
recoverable under a CGL policy. The focus is instead on the appro-
priate classification - defense or indemity - winch should be
ascribed to such costs in the event coverage is ultimately found to
exist.
IV THE MANDATORY NATURE OF AN RI/FS CONDUCTED
PURSUANT TO CERCLA
Whenever it is determined that a release or substantial threat of
release of a hazardous substance into the environment has occurred,
EPA has been authorized pursuant to CERCLA to undertake meas-
ures necessary to remove or contain the substance and remediate any
contamination to the environment caused thereby.2' Authority has
also been vested with EPA to require PRPs to undertake necessary
response actions designed to remediate a waste site or prevent the
Becker Metals Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 802 F Supp. 235 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Upjohn
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 768 F Supp. 1186 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Detrex
Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1988); Ulrich
Chem. Inc. v. Amencan States Ins. Co., 1990 WL 484974 (Ind. Ct. App. July 26,1990);
Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990); City of Evart v.
Home Ins. Co., No. 103621, slip op. (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 1989); Borg-Warner
Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 577 N.Y.S.2d 953 (N.Y. 1992); Techmcon Elec. Corp.
v. American Home Assurance Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), affd on
other grounds, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1989); Professional Rental Inc. v. Shelby Ins.
Co., 599 N.E.2d 423 (Ohio 1991).
19. 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). But see Morton Int'l v. General
Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 847 (NJ. 1993).
20. 528 A.2d at 76. See also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d
1507 (9th Cir. 1991); Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir.
1989); Village of Morrisville Water & Light Dep't v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 775 F
Supp. 718 (D. Vt. 1991); City of Corvallis v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 1991
WL 523876 (D. Or. May 30, 1991); Teledyne v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 908363,
slip op. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1992); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Spe-
cialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. 1989); Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Polkow v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 447
N.W.2d 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 476 N.W.2d 382 (Mich.
1991); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557
(N.C. 1990); Cascade Pole Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., No. 88-2-2316-3, slip op. (Wash.
Super. Ct. June 12, 1992); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 607
(Wash. 1990).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (a)(1) (1988).
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release of hazardous substances into the environment. This response
includes performing an RI/FS at a National Priorities List (NPL) site
targeted by EPA for clean-up. -
Pursuant to CERCLA, the clean-up of environmental contamina-
tion at an NPL site is conducted pursuant to the strictures of the Na-
tional Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP).P The NCP is administered by EPA.24 The NCP implements
standards and procedures for responding to the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances in the environment.25 Pursuant to
CERCLA, these standards and procedures must comprise at least the
following:
(1) methods for discovering and investigating facilities at which
hazardous substances have been disposed of or otherwise come to
be located;
(2) methods for evaluating, including analyses of relative cost, and
remedying any releases or threats of releases from facilities which
pose substantial danger to the public health or the environment;
(3) methods and criteria for deterimmng the appropriate extent of
removal, remedy, and other measures authorized by this chapter
26
The procedures established by the NCP for evaluating and
remediating environmental contamination are compulsory in nature.27
A PRP can be compelled by EPA to undertake all remedial measures
consistent with the NCP. This includes performing an RI/FS to de-
termine the extent of pollution and the most cost efficient clean-up
alternative. 29
The enforcement provisions of CERCLA are critical to the analysis
of whether costs associated with an RI/FS should be classified as de-
fense or indemnmty under a policy of CGL insurance. Waste site PRPs
retain investigators and experts to assist in developing a remediation
plan that will be acceptable to EPA. In this regard, a private party
PRP will only be allowed to perform an RI/FS if EPA determines
[t]hat the party is qualified to conduct the RIIFS and only if the
President [EPA] contracts with or arranges for a qualified person to
assist the President [EPA] in overseeing and reviewing the conduct
of such RIIFS and if the responsible party agrees to reimburse the
22. Id.
23. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1993).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988).
25. Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 300.1, "[t]he purpose of the National Oil and Hazard-
ous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) is to provide the organizational
structure and procedures for prepanng for and responding to discharges of oil and
releases of hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants."
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1988).
27. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.400-300.440 (1990).
28. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(c) (1990).
29. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(i)-(iii) (1990).
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Fund for any cost incurred by the President [EPA] under, or in con-
nection with, the oversight contract or arrangement.30
Unlike the defense of a lawsuit, where a party makes largely tactical
decisions in its retention of investigators and expert consultants, CER-
CLA's criteria for allowing a private party to perform an RIIFS man-
date that only those qualified professionals who are acceptable to the
government may be retained to assist in the remediation process.3'
This requirement militates in favor of classifying costs associated with
performing an RI/FS as indemnification rather than as defense
expenditures.
V. CLASSIFYING RI/FS COSTS UNDER A CGL POLICY
A limited number of cases have addressed the issue of how to class-
ify RI/FS costs under a policy of CGL insurance. The courts which
have examined the issue, however, have generally held that such
amounts are to be considered indemnification rather than defense
costs. In one such case, Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity
Insurance Co.,32 at issue was coverage for, inter alia, approximately
$30 million in site investigation costs incurred by the rocket manufac-
turer Aerojet-General Corporation. 33 The costs were incurred in con-
nection with the remediation of environmental pollution at a
manufacturing facility located near Rancho Cordova, Califorma.34
Aerojet sought coverage for these investigative costs under various
CGL policies issued by the defendant insurers.35
In an effort to satisfy government clean-up requirements under
CERCLA, Aerojet performed an RI/FS which included the drilling of
1,400 groundwater monitonng wells.36 An issue arose as to how costs
associated with the RI/FS were to be classified under Aerojet's liabil-
ity policies.37 Aerojet took the position that the insurers' duty to de-
fend contemplated an obligation to pay costs incurred in connection
with performing site investigative procedures. 38 Aerojet claimed its
attorneys used information gathered during the RI/FS process to de-
fend private party lawsuits filed by landowners who lived near the
contaminated manufacturing facility.39 Aerojet argued that govern-
ment mandated RI/FS costs fell under the duty to defend component
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988).
31. Id.
32. No. 262425, slip op. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1992).
33. Aerojet Jury Denies Coverage for Investigation Costs, MEALEY'S LrriG. REP.
(INs.), Feb. 18, 1992, at 8.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Transcript of Jan. 24, 1992 at 13,751, Aerojet (No. 262425).
37. Aerojet, slip op. at 6.
38. Transcript, supra note 36, at 13,748.
39. Aerojet Jury Denies Coverage for Investigations Costs, supra note 33, at 8.
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of the defendant insurers' respective CGL policies.4° Aerojet took the
position that the duty to defend entitles the policyholder to a reason-
able investigation as part of its defense.4' Since Aerojet's lawyers al-
legedly used the information developed during the RI/FS to assist in
negotiating and defending Aerojet in litigation, Aerojet claimed costs
associated with the investigation were defense costs.42
The insurers m the Aerojet case prevailed upon the court to instruct
the jury that RI/FS costs should be classified as indemnification rather
than defense costs.43 The insurers argued that under CERCLA, site
remediation includes a mandatory RI/FS performed by the site
PRPs.44 The RI/FS performed by Aerojet, the insurers claimed, was
an integral part of the overall site clean-up for which Aerojet sought
indemnification under the insurers' policies.45 It was thus the insurers'
position that the expenses attendant to performing the RI/FS, includ-
ing negotiating with the government, were not included as part of the
duty to defend under the CGL policies.46
The court in the Aerojet case relied on the California Supreme
Court decision in AIU Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara
County.47 In the AIU case, it was held that the cost of contracting for
and implementing site clean-up measures constituted "damages"
within the meaning of that term in a CGL policy. The AIU court
stated,
[B]ecause the compensable loss is all remedial out-of-pocket ex-
penditures incurred by the agencies, the "compensation" sought..
includes reimbursement for costs of cleaning up existing contamina-
tion on and off the disposal site itself, investigating the extent of
contamination or the viability of cleanup options and monitoring
the spread of waste from the site as long as some "property dam-
age" . . . has already taken place, the agencies' expenses for re-
sponding constitute loss or detriment, whether or not the expenses
are attributable to actual cleanup, mitigation of damage, or investi-
gation and monitoring. When the agencies seek reimbursement of
such expenses from the insured under CERCLA, their claim is for
compensation for all their expenses, not merely those resulting from
actual cleanup efforts on government property. Any other conclu-
40. Transcript, supra note 36, at 13,747.
41. Id. at 13,757-58.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 13,783. See Aerojet General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Ins. Co., No.
262,425, Slip Op., (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1992) (order finding Aerojet's
site investigation costs are not defense costs).
44. Transcript, supra note 36, at 13,748.
45. Id. at 13,748.
46. Id. at 13,747.
47. 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990) (referred to at Transcript, supra note 36, at 13,783).
See also Aerojet Loses Defense Costs Ruling After Coverage Trial Loss, MEALEY'S
LMG. REP. (INs.), Jan. 28, 1992, at 5 [hereinafter Aerojet Loses Defense Costs].
1994]
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sion would be illogical as a matter of the reasonable expectations of
the insured."s
The trial judge in the Aerojet case was persuaded by the mandatory
nature of the Aerojet's site investigative activity.49 The court thus in-
structed the jury that RI/FS costs are to be classified as indemnity
rather than defense.50 One of the instructions read:
All sums which Aerojet paid (1) because of government orders or
requests to investigate, cleanup or remediate, or (2) because of Aer-
ojet's agreement or commitment to perform the investigation, clean
up [sic] or remediation are indemnity expenses, and therefore not
recoverable as defense costs.
Investigation costs, such as investigating the extent of contamnna-
tion or the viability of cleanup options and monitoring the spread of
waste from the site, which were incurred as part of Aerojet's effort
to cleanup or remediate the site are not considered defense costs.
If the costs involved here were necessary to or part of Aerojet's
effort to cleanup and remediate the site, such costs are not defense
costs, even if Aerojet's lawyers used information developed during
the investigation to assist them in negotiating with the government
to limit Aerojet's obligation to cleanup and remediate.fi
A case which addressed coverage for fees of expert consultants re-
tained to assist m the defense of a lawsuit filed by state environmental
authorities, as well as in the clean-up of the site at issue in the lawsuit,
is New York v. Blank.52 In this case, the State of New York brought
an action pursuant to CERCLA and various New York State environ-
mental laws against Walter Blank alleging he had been the owner of a
pest exterminating company which had contaminated the site with
hazardous materials.53 The State sought, among other things, to com-
pel Blank to take steps necessary to investigate and remediate the site,
as well as to reimburse the State for costs incurred in responding to
the pollution emanating from the site.54 Blank filed a third-party ac-
tion against his insurers seeking coverage for the defense of the main
action and for any site clean-up liabilities.55
The trial court granted partial summary judgment on a motion filed
by Blank in the third-party action against his insurers.56 The court
held that the insurer, Capital Mutual, was obligated to defend Blank
in connection with the first-party action filed by the State.57 The court
48. AIU, 799 P.2d at 1270 (citations omitted).
49. Aerojet Loses Defense Costs, supra note 47, at 5.
50. Phase III Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 4: Site Investigation Costs,
Aerojet (No. 262425).
51. Id.
52. 745 F Supp. 841 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
53. Id. at 842.
54. Id. at 847.
55. Id. at 843.
56. Id.
57 Id.
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also instructed the parties to attempt to resolve between themselves
the amount of fees due as defense costs. 58 When no agreement could
be reached, the insurers filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to be relieved from the court's judg-
ment. One of the bases for the motion was that certain of the costs
sought by Blank were not covered as defense costs.59
Among the amounts which Blank sought to recover as defense costs
were $159,372.25 in fees charged by a firm of environmental consul-
tants.60 Blank retained the consulting firm to assist both in the de-
fense of the clean-up action filed by the State of New York and in
performing the clean-up itself.6 1 The court distinguished these tasks
in rendering its award on the insurers' motion.62 The court held that
fees for services performed by the consultants in connection with the
defense of the State's lawsuit were recoverable as defense costs. 63 The
court noted, however, that much of the work done by the consultants
was "aimed at the remediation of the site, as opposed to developing
an expert defense."'  The court thus held that, under the circum-
stances of the Blank case, the expert consultant's fees attributable to
the "planning and execution of the site cleanup are more in the nature
of indemnification costs and, therefore, are not recoverable, if at all,
until after a determination on the merits."65
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wash-
ington addressed the issue of how to classify RI/FS costs m Spokane
County v. American Re-Insurance Co.66 In Spokane, the insured al-
leged that its insurers were liable for defense and indemnity with re-
spect to the clean-up of the Colbert Landfill located in Spokane
County, Washington. The insured filed a motion for summary judg-
ment seeking, inter alia, recovery of an unspecified amount of RI/FS
costs. The insured argued that such costs fell within the insurers' duty
to defend.67 The insurers argued that the RI/FS costs should be classi-
fied as indemnification rather than defense costs because they were an
inextricable part of the overall site clean-up remedy.68
In ruling that RI/FS costs were not related to the defense of the
insured, the United States District Court in Spokane case employed
reasoning similar to that used by the California Supreme Court m the
Aerojet-General case. The District Court looked to the Washington
58. Id.
59. Id. at 852.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. No. CS-90-256-WFN, slip op. (E.D. Wash. May 10, 1993).
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id.
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Supreme Court decision in the case of Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,69 wherein it was held that response costs incurred pursuant
to a CERCLA clean-up directive constitute "damages" within the
meaning of that term in a CGL policy 70 The court in Spokane rea-
soned that all costs related to a CERCLA clean-up, whether they con-
cern performance of an RI/FS or implementation of the clean-up
remedy, are mandatory.7' The court distinguished mandatory investi-
gative efforts under CERCLA from an investigation conducted as
part of the defense of a lawsuit against the policyholder.72
An analogous case decided by a Michigan appellate court is Gelman
Sciences, Inc. v Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos.73 At issue in this case
was coverage for costs incurred by the policyholder, Gelman Sciences,
to remedy contamination caused by its manufacturing operations. 74
Gelman had been notified by Michigan's Washtenaw County Health
Department that 1,4 dioxane used by Gelman had contaminated area
water supplies.75 Gelman thereafter incurred substantial costs in con-
nection with mitigating the effects of the groundwater contamnna-
tion.76 This included connecting private parties to the city water
system, installing sewers, and paying for the assistance of attorneys
and expert consultants to assist in the process.77
Gelman tendered the claim to Fireman's Fund, seeking coverage for
reimbursal of more than $800,000 associated with installing water line
hookups for residents and businesses whose water supplies had be-
come contaminated.78 Gelman also demanded that Fireman's Fund
pay $110,000 related to installation of a sewer system.79 Fireman's
Fund denied coverage for the claim. This prompted Gelman to file
suit against Fireman's Fund seeking recovery of all amounts incurred
in connection with remedying groundwater contamination.8 °
The trial court ordered Gelman and Fireman's Fund each to pay
one half of the remediation costs while a final ruling on the classifica-
tion of the amounts as either defense or indemity was pending.8'
Fireman's Fund appealed this ruling claiming that the costs associated
with the water line hookup and sewer installation were in the form of
indemnification rather than defense.' Fireman's Fund argued that
69. 784 P.2d 507, 516 (Wash. 1990).
70. Spokane, slip op. at 4.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id. at 4-5.
73. 455 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
74. Id. at 328.
75. Id. at 329.
76. Id. at 329-30.
77. Id. at 330.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Gelman characterized such amounts as defense costs m order to ex-
ceed the policy's indemnification limit.8 3
In deciding the appropriate classification of the sums incurred by
Gelman, the Michigan appeals court relied on the definitions of de-
fense costs and indemnification found in a legal dictionary. 84 The
court noted that defense costs are defined to include "moies ex-
pended to develop and put forth a theory that the defendant is not
liable," while "indemnification costs, being damages, are monies paid
to compensate for injury suffered by the plaintiff through the unlawful
act or omission or negligence of another."' 5 The court reasoned that
costs associated with the water hookups and sewer installation were
not necessary to defend Gelman in the underlying matter.86 These
costs were more akin to indemnification because they were incurred
in an effort to mitigate potential future Injury that could have resulted
from the contaminated groundwater.87 The court thus held that the
amounts, if covered, were to be classified as indemnification rather
than defense costs. 8
A case from the United States District Court in Michigan that used
the reasoning employed in Gelman Sciences is Higgins Industries, Inc.
v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.89 This was a declaratory judgment
action wherein the policyholder, Higgms, sought coverage from the
defendant insurers for costs associated with a groundwater investiga-
tion.90 A groundwater consultant was retained to perform the investi-
gation after the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)
detected groundwater contamination at premises located adjacent to
the insured's property.91 Following this discovery, MDNR issued a
notice of noncompliance with the wastewater discharge permit under
which Higgins had been conducting its business.92 Higgins asked its
insurers to pay the costs associated with responding to the MDNR
investigation. 93 The insurers refused to pay the costs on the ground
that no duty to defend existed unless and until formal legal proceed-
ings involving Higgms were filed.94
The court granted H-iggins' motion for summary judgment on the
duty to defend.95 The court held that the insurer's duty to defend
arose upon the "actual or threatened use of legal process to coerce
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 351-52 (5th Ed. 1979)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 730 F Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
90. Id. at 774.
91. Id. at 775.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 778.
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payment" on environmental clean-up by the policyholder.96 The court
ordered the parties to identify the costs associated with the defense of
the MDNR clean-up matter.97 The parties agreed that fees incurred
prior to July 1, 1987, when the consultant's report identified Higgins as
the source of groundwater contamination, would be classified as de-
fense costs.98 However, the parties could not agree on how to classify
approximately $800,000 of the consultant's fees incurred after July 1,
1987. 99 The policyholder argued that the fees were defense costs. The
insurers said the fees were incurred as part of the overall site remedia-
tion.1°° The court noted that "[t]he hazy line between what costs may
be attributed to the defense of a claim and what costs are attributable
to indemnification form[ed] the basis of the dispute." 01
The matter was submitted to a federal magistrate for resolution.
After an evidentiary hearing, the court divided the disputed fees into
defense and indemnification based on the nature of the consultant's
work:
I am convinced that the consultative work performed after July 1,
1987 must be characterized as falling into the indemnification cate-
gory and that these costs are not now reimbursable to Higgins. Up
through July 1, 1987, the date of the initial report, the investigation
and its attendant costs were focused on determining what sub-
stances were in the soil and groundwater, how far it had travelled,
and most significantly, where it had originated. This work was
therefore designed to assist Higgins in determining whether or not it
was liable for the cleanup as claimed by the MDNR. As the focus
of this portion of the investigation was the issue of liability, the por-
tion of the work clearly fell within the definition of defense costs
102
Two principal factors appear to have influenced the court's decision
to classify some of the consultant's fees as defense costs in the Higgins
case.10 3 First, the court's analysis was partially shaped by the agree-
ment between Higgins and the insurers to classify as defense costs
consultant's fees incurred prior to July 1, 1987.' °4 The second factor
was that the fees incurred prior to July 1, 1987 were not associated
with a mandatory undertaking such as an RI/FS. According to the
opinion, the pre-July 1, 1987 fees primarily concerned Higgins' at-
tempt to determine whether or not it was the cause of groundwater
96. Id.
97 Id. at 779.
98. No. 87-CV-10406, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 1990), reprinted in MEA-
LEY's LrrIG. REP. (INs.), Nov. 20, 1990, at B1.
99. Id. at 4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id. at 11-12.
104. Id. at 3.
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contamination and, therefore, whether it was liable for the clean-
up.10 5 This is what distinguishes Higgins from the other cases which
have addressed the classification issue.
Had the pre-July 1, 1987, consultative work in Higgins been a com-
pulsory component of a statutorily scripted site clean-up, it is ques-
tionable whether the parties or the court would have divided the fees
into defense and indemmty.10 6 It was only when Higgins had been
identified as the contaminant source that attention turned to planning
for and implementing the clean-up. 0 7 The circumstances underlying
Higgins thus can be contrasted from an RI/FS performed under CER-
CLA. Investigative efforts that are part of an RI/FS are an insepara-
ble part of the site remediation process.'0 Had all investigative work
in Higgins been part of a specific statutory clean-up plan, the better
reasoned approach would have been to classify attendant costs as in-
demnity rather than defense.
The few environmental coverage cases which have addressed the
issue of how to classify RI/FS costs under a CGL policy have sensibly
distinguished between the mandatory nature of the RI/FS process and
the more permissive or tactical decisions governing the retention of
experts in connection with the defense of a lawsuit. As outlined be-
low, cases addressing the nature of a PRP's liability for clean-up costs
under CERCLA provide further justification for classifying RI/FS ex-
penses under an insurance policy as indemnification rather than de-
fense costs.
VI. AUTHORrrY FROM OUTSIDE THE COVERAGE ARENA
Guidance on the issue of how to classify RI/ES costs can be found
in cases that do not involve insurance coverage issues. For instance, in
Wickland Oil Terminals v Asarco, Inc.,0 9 the purchaser of contam-
105. Id. at 11.
106. The decision is unclear as to whether Higgins' investigation into the identity of
the party responsible for groundwater contamination was a compulsory component of
the overall clean-up. No environmental statute is cited in the opinion, although it is
revealed that the MDNR inspected the site and informed Higgins of the results and
Higgms "employed Keck Consulting Services to investigate and test the ground-
water." Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 8, 11.
108. The scope of an RI/PS is defined in the NCP as follows:
Remedial investigation/feasibility study. The purpose of the remedial investi-
gation/feasibility study (RI/FS) is to assess site conditions and evaluate alter-
natives to the extent necessary to select a remedy. Developing and
conducting an RI/ES generally includes the following activities: project scop-
ing, data collection, risk assessment, treatability studies, and analysis of al-
ternatives. The scope and timing of these activities should be tailored to the
nature and complexity of the problem and the response alternatives being
considered.
40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(2) (1993).
109. 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
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nated property, Wickland, filed an action for damages and declaratory
judgment against Asarco, the prior owner of the site.110 At issue were
costs incurred by Wickland to remediate contamination caused by
Asarco's use of the site for smelting operations."' The California De-
partment of Health Services (CDHS) identified environmentally-haz-
ardous slag deposits at the site (up to one million metric tons above
the surface and an unknown amount below) as the source of ground-
water contamination." 2 The CDHS directed Wickland as owner of
the site to undertake an appropriate clean-up." 3
In response to the CDHS directive, Wickland performed certain
tests designed to evaluate the ongoing threat to the environment
posed by the slag deposits. 1 4 This activity was conducted under the
guidance and direction of the CDHS and cost Wickland approxi-
mately $150,000."1- Pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a)," 6 Wick-
land sued Asarco to recoup these costs, and for a judicial declaration
that Asarco was solely liable under CERCLA for any additional costs
that would be required to remediate the site.117 The Umted States
District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Wick-
land's complaint for failure to state a claim under CERCLA." 8 One
of the bases for the dismissal was that the investigative costs were not
recoverable pursuant to CERCLA because they were not "response"
costs as defined in the statute." 9 Wickland appealed the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court's dismissal of Wickland's claims against
Asarco and remanded the case.' 20 The Court of Appeals held that
there is no difference between investigative costs and actual clean-up
costs for purposes of recovery under CERCLA.121 The court noted
that CERCLA allows recovery of response costs incurred in connec-
tion with "such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances." 22
The court thus concluded that the costs associated with Wickland's
110. Id. at 889.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 889.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
117 Wickland Oil Terminals, 792 F.2d at 889.
118. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
119. Id. at 76-78.
120. Wickland Oil Terminals, 792 F.2d at 888.
121. Id. at 892.
122. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988)).
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investigation of site contamination were recoverable from Asarco be-
cause they were mandatory under CERCLA.'"
CONCLUSION
The integral role of an RI/FS in a waste facility clean-up pursuant to
CERCLA, or similar compulsory activities under state statutes, mili-
tates heavily in favor of classifying related costs as indemnification
rather than defense under a policy of CGL insurance. This is an espe-
cially important consideration in cases where defense costs do not
serve to deplete the policy limits. To define RI/FS costs as part of the
duty to defend in such instances could result in insurers being exposed
to exponentially more coverage liability than they bargained for when
issuing their policies.
123. Id. at 892. See also Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149,
1153 (9th Cir. 1989) ("'response costs' under CERCLA can include the costs of inves-
tigation or testing for the presence of hazardous wastes"); Artesian Water Co. v. New
Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 651 (3d Cir. 1988) (costs of monitoring and evaluating
aquifer to ensure that neighboring landfill did not contaminate water supply were
recoverable under CERCLA); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir. 1988) (investigatory costs are included within re-
sponse costs recoverable under CERCLA); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1985) (state's costs in assessing the conditions of the site
fall squarely within CERCLA's definition of response costs); Gache v. Town of Ham-
son, 813 F Supp. 1037, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (preliminary investigatory and monitor-
ing costs are recoverable under CERCLA regardless of the recoverability of other
response costs).
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